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The Stirrings of a Stubborn and 
Difficult Freedom 




For let us not be mistaken: it was precisely those liberal-
minded Germans in charge of forming policy concerning 
Jews who worked under the assumption that 
emancipation will solve the Jewish question by leading to 
a kind of assimilation which even the most fervent 
assimilationist among us—as long as he wants to remain 
Jewish—will reject.  
--Franz Rosenzweig1  
[Assimilation] failed because it did not put an end to the 
anguish felt by the Jewish soul. Assimilation failed 
because it did not placate the non-Jews, or put an end to 
anti-Semitism; on certain points, it stirred up heated 
reactions and arguments once more. Anguish and anxiety 
still surreptitiously alter apparently free behavior and 
every Jew remains, in the largest sense of the word, a 
Marrano.  
--Emmanuel Levinas 2 
But in truth I know nothing about education except this: 
that the greatest and the most important difficulty known 
to human learning seems to lie in that area which treats 
how to bring up children and how to educate them.  
--Michel de Montaigne, “On educating children”  
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Levinas opens his 1968 essay, “Humanism and An-Archy,” with an 
assertion that “[t]he crisis of humanism in our times undoubtedly originates 
in an experience of human inefficacy accentuated by the very abundance of 
our means of action and the scope of our ambitions…The unburied dead of 
wars and death camps accredit the idea of a death with no future, making 
tragic-comic the care for one’s self and illusory the pretensions of the 
rational animal to a privileged place in the cosmos, capable of dominating 
and integrating the totality of being into a consciousness of self.”3 Put 
simply, the death camps put to rest any illusion that we are in control, 
masters of our own destiny.  Although this essay was written in 1968, 
similar points can be found in some of his earliest essays of the 1930’s.  
Significantly, Levinas opens “Humanism and An-Archy,” with the 
following epigraph from Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “I love him 
whose soul is overfull so that he forgets himself, and all things are in him: 
thus all things become his downfall.”4 This statement is part of Zarathustra’s 
teaching, which, I have argued elsewhere, is ultimately ineffective.5 It is 
worth commenting, even briefly, on what this particular part of 
Zarathustra’s teaching means and why Levinas uses it to introduce his 
essay.   If Zarathustra is successful in teaching the Overman, the Overman 
will be he whose soul is so full that he is open to all others and that self-
preservation is no longer his highest priority. This capacity to open himself 
to the world is both superlative and self-destructive. He allows all influences 
to touch him—thus, he lets everything come into him.  This view, like the 
one Levinas promotes, runs counter to the prevailing themes promoted by 
social Darwinists, who believe that self-preservation is the highest priority.    
A seminal 19th century existentialist, Nietzsche’s educational 
philosophy, expressed primarily in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, repeats themes 
found earlier in the ancient Greeks, yet with a more sophisticated 
commentary.  Additionally, Nietzsche’s influence on French and German 
existentialism cannot be underestimated—nor should we ignore the fleeting 
negative comments that Levinas directs towards Nietzsche, in spite of 
whatever commonalities Nietzsche and Levinas might have.6  Like Rousseau 
before him, Nietzsche is also able to diagnose the problem of the age in 
which he lives; yet, also like Rousseau, he is unable to provide a cure. 
I open this essay with a reference to Nietzsche and Rousseau precisely 
because they have provided educational models that continue to influence 
our current educational system with regard to its understanding of teaching 
and learning as well as the goals of education. My aim in this essay is not to 
demonstrate that this reading of Nietzsche is correct. My argument does not 
depend on whether the reception of Nietzsche has remained faithful to what 
Nietzsche intended, but only that this happens to be a model for 
understanding the process of education.  I have argued elsewhere that while 
both Nietzsche and Rousseau were able diagnosticians, they both failed in 
their respective attempts to cure the disease they found.  Continuing in this 
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prominent line of thinkers, Levinas throws his own hat into the ring, as both 
a diagnostician and as one who prescribes a cure.   
This essay contends that Levinas’s diagnosis of the problem is a “crisis 
of humanism,” which finds its seeds in modernity but comes to fruition in 
the inhumanities of the 20th century. These inhumanities, Levinas would say, 
signify a violence toward the other that is of a wholly different order from 
those that preceded them. Like his predecessors, he offers an educational 
model as a solution, but here the model—Jewish education—is uniquely 
different from those offered by Rousseau and Nietzsche. Levinas’s proposed 
solution is not only original, but it also allows his readers a glimpse of the 
role that education plays in his larger philosophical project—one that I 
would argue is indispensible to its coherence. This essay examines Levinas’s 
interest in Jewish education as a solution to this crisis in humanism and 
considers what the implications of this solution are for his project as a 
whole.  
Philosophe-Pédagogue 
Levinas initially entered France when the residue of the Dreyfus Affair 
still lingered in the atmosphere.7  Many of Levinas’s teachers had been 
adolescents at the time of the Dreyfus Affair and were deeply affected by 
this event, which raised important questions about the promises and limits 
of Jewish assimilation into the French Republic. Although Levinas 
introduces themes regarding the failure of Jewish assimilation and the 
promise of Jewish education in essays eventually published in Difficult 
Freedom, we see his specific concerns poignantly expressed in his 1954 essay 
“Assimilation Today.”    
In this essay, Levinas explicitly connects the Dreyfus Affair to the years 
of National Socialism, two events that are not only horrifying in the story of 
Jewish history but which also put into question the relationship Judaism had 
to the French Republic’s founding principles—the Principles of 1789—which 
promise freedom and equality for all citizens in the French Republic.8 
Moreover, the French Republic extended citizenship to groups of people 
who prior to this time were not able to have that relationship to the country 
in which they lived.9 Clearly expressing great pain, he reminds his readers 
not only that assimilation failed but also why it failed: 
It failed because it did not put an end to the anguish felt 
by the Jewish soul. Assimilation failed because it did not 
placate the non-Jews, or put an end to anti-Semitism; on 
certain points, it stirred up heated reactions and 
arguments once more. Anguish and anxiety still 
surreptitiously alter apparently free behavior and every 
Jew remains, in the largest sense of the word, a Marrano.10    
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Referring to the Labor Zionist and educator, Chaim Greenberg, Levinas 
cynically observes, “if Jews do not convert to Christianity, it is not because 
they believe in Judaism but because they no longer believe in anything 
religious.”11  He then notes, “the fact that assimilation can succeed only in 
dissolution and that only irreligiousness slows down this dissolution, is the 
most serious crisis of assimilation.”12  Insofar as Jews are no longer unified 
as a group with a common goal—in this case, educating the youth and 
pursuing ethics—Levinas would say that indeed Judaism has been 
dissolved.  Judaism is not a religion of individuals—for example, synagogue 
membership does not count individuals, but families.  The liturgy in a 
synagogue is the same on any given day in synagogues around the world.  
For Levinas, then, the question is not simply whether some people continue 
to call themselves Jews; the question is whether Judaism has lost something 
central to it.  
The discussion of the separation between church and state that Levinas 
takes up in this essay could not be more pressing than it is today, here in the 
United States and elsewhere.13  He notes that that the vice of a philosophy of 
assimilation is its forgetting, or ignorance, of the ways that secularized forms 
of religious life lie at the heart of the so-called secular state.14  For many in 
the secular state, the state’s religious framework need not be made explicit, 
indeed, it need not even be thought—“one breathes it naturally.”15 He 
remarks, “[this separation] does not simply vanish as a result of the juridical 
separation between Church and State.”16   
Israel’s existence then presents an opportunity not available to the Jew 
previously, an opportunity for life in the State to converge with the life of 
conscience.  The individual’s public life need not be separated from her 
private conscience.  This is to say that the state of Israel allows for an 
individual to practice one’s beliefs in both public and private. Ironically, 
Israel’s reality also makes “the error of assimilation” more visible to the Jew 
who does not live there: “The Jew’s entry into the national life of European 
states has led them to breathe an atmosphere impregnated with Christian 
essence and that prepares them for the religious life of these states and 
heralds their conversion.”17 The secular states which are founded on a 
Christian structure, support the Christian atmosphere that informs it but 
which is an atmosphere that is perceived—or passes itself off—as secular.  
It is to the Jew who resists, who tries to swim against this current, that 
the secular is revealed as religious.  Thus, the Jew must make a decision, a 
decision that includes a return to Hebrew.  And again, as he does in every 
other essay on Jewish education, he reminds his readers that this return, this 
reclaiming of Judaism, does not refute the principles achieved through the 
French Revolution and the development of the French Republic. Rather, 
“these old texts teach precisely a universalism that is purged of any 
particularism tied to the land… It teaches the human solidarity of a nation 
united by ideas.”18  Finally, the Jew must ask the most pressing of questions: 
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“Do we still want to be Jews?  Do we still believe in the excellence of 
Judaism?”  Importantly, Levinas distinguishes this question from the more 
clichéd, “Do you believe in God?” The former, he notes, has more meaning 
for the modern person than the latter.  
I want to emphasize the biographical point that Levinas returned to 
France after World War II and remained in France for the duration of his 
life—the next 50 years.  What makes Levinas’s life and thought rich is 
precisely his own ambivalence about the possibilities and opportunities 
offered by citizenship in the French Republic. The very same principles that 
guaranteed these opportunities also enabled the Republic to disregard or 
marginalize the particular groups within it.   
This ambivalence runs throughout his work. He lived his life as a 
“particular” who both benefited and suffered because of his relationship to 
the “universal.” It is all the more interesting, then, that he dedicated a good 
part of his intellectual life to strengthening Jewish education in France—to 
keeping the particular alive within the universal.  Indeed, he believed that 
the key to the working relationship between the two rested on successfully 
reintroducing a deeper relationship to Jewish education within the French 
Jewish community: “After Auschwitz, I had the impression that in taking on 
the directorship of the École Normal Israélite Orientale I was responding to a 
historical calling. It was my little secret…Probably the naiveté of a young 
man.  I am still mindful and proud of it today.”19  Levinas made this 
statement n the occasion of a celebration for his 80th birthday, which brought 
together a collection of his former students from those years and issued in a 
small publication, Levinas—Philosophe et Pédagogue, which collected several 
short essays on Levinas as a teacher, Talmudist, and philosopher.20 This 
collection comprises a select few of the commentaries offered by Levinas’s 
own students. Each in its own way reveals Levinas as a teacher and a 
philosopher of the highest order.  But one statement in particular stands out 
in its unique character. Ady Steg, who was the President of the Alliance 
Israélite Universelle, the organization under which the ENIO operated, at the 
time of the celebration, offered this fable speculating about the time when 
Levinas stands before the Heavenly Throne.21  
A Fable  
In about forty years, when you appear before the Heavenly Throne, if he 
were to ask you:  
  
“Emmanuel Levinas, what have you done with your life?”  
 
You reply, “I committed myself to philosophy and I believed in the good 
and the just as I have written in my books.” 
 
Ady Steg: “Very well,” He would reply to you, “And?” 
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EL: “I studied with Husserl and Heidegger.” 
 
HT: “Heidegger? Hmm…And?” 
 
EL: I studied also with Chouchani. 
 
HT: “Marvelous!  Chouchani, it is true, entered the soul of the Talmud! 
And?” 
 
EL: “Based on his teachings, I have given numerous Talmudic Lessons to 
the Colloquia of Jewish Intellectuals.”  
 
HT: “Bravo!  How indeed is one able to understand the Torah without the 
light of the oral law! And?” 
 
EL: “Precisely. I have thus been able to comment on the Torah at the École 
Normale Israélite Orientale of the Alliance on Shabbat mornings.”  
 
HT: “At the school?” 
 
EL: “Yes, I have indeed run this school during the last many years.”  
 
HT: “Director of the school, you, a prestigious philosopher?” 
 
EL: “Yes, director of the school.” 
 
To these words, Cherubs and Seraphs, Ofanim and Archangels begin 
singing a glorious hymn and you will be led to the right of the Eternal 
One.   
Although this fable is presented as a hypothetical meeting between 
Levinas and the Heavenly Throne, one cannot help but wonder if Steg is 
voicing his own sentiments as the president of the AIU and the ENIO, 
organizations that identify education as central to their respective missions.  
Steg’s fable emphasizes something unique in the life of an esteemed 
academic: that for all of Levinas’s academic accomplishments—and there are 
many—it will be his directorship of a Jewish day school that impresses the 
Heavenly Throne.  The fable indicates the weight placed on education—
general studies and Jewish education—by those who worked for the AIU, 
some of whom were Levinas’s students while he was the director. When 
Levinas stands before the heavenly throne and must recount his 
accomplishments, the Eternal One is impressed by his intellectual 
accomplishments. But it was his role as Director of the ENIO, which trained 
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the teachers who eventually taught in schools in Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Lebanon, of which the Eternal One takes note.   
The Eternal One’s surprise that a famous philosopher directed a school 
clearly indicates that, in spite of Levinas’s academic accomplishments, he 
was not too proud or arrogant to devote himself to the education of the 
younger generation.22  Nonetheless, The Eternal One’s added question—
“you, a famous philosopher?”—spoken with more than a hint of doubt or 
suspicion, betrays the more common negative sentiment towards education 
and those who educate.  The range of negative attitudes creates a powerful 
force pushing against education, hindering any possibility of real reform: no 
one believes that education produces anything positive; only those who are 
not good at anything else would go into teaching; and teaching is so easy 
that teachers should not be compensated adequately for doing such a job. 
In contrast to this view of education and teaching, Levinas saw both as 
salvific, not only for the Jewish people but also for humankind in the larger 
sweep of history.23  The future of the world rests on how we educate our 
young people. Ady Steg’s fable is certainly written for effect. But it is not lost 
on any of his students from the ENIO; nor is it lost on those who read his 
essays on Jewish education that his view of education is not just a side 
hobby in which he engaged.  It was fundamental to his philosophical 
project.  
Ami Bouganim makes this point in his Postface to Levinas: Philosophe et 
Pédagoge when he confesses that “in France, philosophy does not hold 
education in much esteem; it is willing to consider it as one of its 
applications, but in no case as one of its determinations.  However, Levinas 
spent the greatest part of his days on administrative tasks as a school 
director, melding a real interest in pedagogy with his research in 
philosophy.”24 Bouganim’s essay is rich with insights about Jewish 
education internationally, and he tells us that even in Israel there was little 
success in facing the de-judaization of its young people.  He proudly states 
that the ENIO was one of the rare places where one could reflect on Jewish 
education.25 Although the United States saw the origination of the first 
Sunday schools and the first Ramah camps,26 “[n]owhere in the Diaspora did 
anyone yet consider the perpetuation of the Jewish people in terms of Jewish 
education…Levinas was one of the rare individuals to think the Jewish 
destiny otherwise than in political terms, wagering on ‘an education which 
does not separate human beings,’ recognizing in ethics the first and last word of 
Judaism.”27 Importantly, and I am citing at length:  
Levinas did not want to cultivate piety, thus, distancing 
himself from any ‘pedagogy of exaltation’ where 
enthusiasm would try to make up for the deficiencies in 
studying and the failures in intelligence… Levinas 
thought that if Judaism did not speak to the young 
C l a i r e  K a t z  |  9 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XVIII, No 1 (2008-2010)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2010.173 
generations who cried out for Marx or declaimed 
Heidegger, falling prey to the false messianic promises or 
to puerile charms, it was because nobody any longer went 
to the trouble of addressing them on their condition with a 
somewhat coherent discourse.  Only to harness it to 
education did Levinas wrench the Science of Judaism from 
the pure and heard philosophy which, since the beginning 
of the [twentieth] century, gave off—to repeat Scholem—
whiffs of death: ‘To raise Judaism into a science, to think 
Judaism, is to turn these texts back into teaching texts’ 
(Levinas 1951).28 … Levinas was interested in Talmud, and 
more especially in the aggada, diving once again in the 
raging sea of controversies, sweeping along behind him 
disciples from all nations who could be filled with wonder 
at his obstinacy—wholly Judaic—in persisting in 
humanism, simply humanism. … He spoke Greek only to 
better reach listeners and readers who had lost their 
Hebrew, not to mention their Aramaean, and only because 
he understood a discourse on Judaism which was 
articulated according to the snares of philosophical reason.  
Perhaps Levinas was not so much from Maimonides’s 
school, which installed the Greek science under ‘the tents 
of the Torah’ as from Philo’s school—less deceived and 
more experienced than the historical Philo—who carried 
the Judaic diversion to the very heart of Greek wisdom.  In 
fact, he was mostly ‘Lithuanian,’ irremediably so, locating 
Judaism ‘at the intersection of faith and reason,’ pushing it 
in its secular entrenchments only to better tap into a 
Jewish secularism [laïcté] which could vie with a 
secularism [laïcté] readily masking its Christian motives.29 
These themes express not only Levinas’s dedication to Jewish education 
but also Bouganim’s belief that the relationship between this commitment 
and his philosophical project pervades the essays he wrote on Jewish 
education while he was director of the ENIO.  
Many of these essays are collected under the title Difficult Freedom: 
Essays on Judaism, and they span approximately twenty-five years, from the 
early 1950’s to the mid 1970’s. These essays on Jewish education were 
written not only during his fifteen years as Director of the Ecole Normale 
Israélite Orientale, but also after he left the ENIO to become a university 
professor. They mirror themes in Levinas’s philosophical project from the 
1960’s, which we could argue he was developing at the same time that the 
majority of these essays were written.  Additionally, the concerns expressed 
most explicitly in the essays on Jewish education pick up the concerns he 
expressed in several writings before the war, most notably the 1934 essay, 
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“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism,” and the one immediately 
following it in 1935, which was published in English as On Escape.   That is, 
his essays in Jewish education mirror the same suspicion he has of Western 
or European man—even that which he calls the philosopher—found in his 
other writings, both Jewish and philosophical.  
 Bouganim’s comments also go directly to the heart of Levinas’s essays 
in Difficult Freedom, which when read together powerfully reveal a secularity 
that is not secular.  The political structure that appears secular in fact masks 
the Christianity that pervades it. Tying these points together, one cannot 
help but see that Levinas’s suspicion of Western subjectivity is at root a 
suspicion of Christianity, thus revealing another of Levinas’s ambivalences.  
Although he sees a fraternal relationship between Judaism and Christianity, 
and although he credits individual Christians whose courage during the 
Nazi occupation is to be noted and commended, he nonetheless sees 
Christianity as the origin of the Western subjectivity that allows for an ego-
centric ethics and a subjectivity that values freedom above all.   As Levinas 
warns us in these essays, the Jew who pushes against the mask cannot help 
but see behind it; the Jew who does not resist the status quo continues to 
believe that he is following a secular, universal state. Yet, the latter believes 
this only because he is not versed enough in either Judaism or Christianity 
to know otherwise.  Bouganim’s reading of Levinas is telling and many 
often forget that the articulation of the Hebrew into Greek is not only for the 
benefit of those who are not Jewish but also for the benefit of those who no 
longer know, or never knew in the first place, the language of Judaism.  
These essays are written contemporaneously with several essays in 
which Levinas argues for Judaism’s universalism.  Read together, they ask 
us to consider both the peculiar nature of Judaism and its potential for a 
universal application.  There is a dimension of Judaism, Levinas argues, that 
is universal and this dimension is also what makes Judaism uniquely Jewish. 
Thus, while Jewish education hopes to succeed in maintaining that which 
makes Judaism unique, it is clear from Levinas’s writings on Judaism in 
general, that he believes the ethical impulse that is fundamentally and 
uniquely expressed in Judaism applies to everyone. At this point, I wish to 
return to Levinas’s final essay on Jewish education and explore it in some 
detail.  
Levinas opens his 1973 essay, “Antihumanism and Education,” by 
connecting the Western view of humanism with a conception of freedom 
that is protected by the liberal state.30  The movement of humanism begins 
with a respect for the person, the blossoming of human nature, the 
cultivation of creativity in Art, intelligence in Science, and pleasure in daily 
life.31 The introduction of just law follows from our freedom to pursue our 
own pleasures—but this introduction also reveals the limit of law.  On the 
one hand, law is necessary to safeguard our freedoms—to maintain peace 
among the nations, with other states. It provides the “opening up for 
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individuals as broad as possible a domain for private life,” which is where 
the law stops.32 But in this regard, humanism can see only the law of the 
state or the laws of nature. Humanism worships the principles for which it 
stands. Levinas reveals his distaste for this kind of humanism when he notes 
that the focus on the beautiful transmission of these ideals led to a focus on 
the beautiful language in which these ideals are expressed.  The noble ideals 
and principles themselves were “lost in rhetoric and ideology,” and the 
intellectual contact with these ideals thus became confused with action.33 
Levinas admits that there is nonetheless a connection between the 
humanism of the belles-lettres and the Biblical ideal of humanism.  The 
attachment to books is also fundamental to Judaism, which is tethered to the 
Torah, the Talmud, and other sacred writings.  Judaism too is vulnerable to 
degenerating into ideology.34   This connection though is only apparent and 
he asks, “Can the whole of Western humanism pass for a secularization of 
Judeo-Christianity?  Have the rights of man and of the citizen and the new 
spirit that conquered in the eighteenth century not fulfilled in our minds the 
promises of the prophets?”35  
These questions reveal precisely what is at stake in his discussion.  In 
the move to secularize Judaism’s ethical impulse into Western humanism, 
Judaism let go of what made it unique. It severed the particular link it had to 
the prophets, in particular, to the rabbinic tradition through which the 
voices of the prophets reverberate. This forgetting, however, enabled a 
Judeo-Christian friendship, a noble friendship secured by noble and 
courageous actions during World War II.  But this friendship masks their 
fundamental differences at the level of doctrine and belief.  The Jew lives in 
a world that has been fashioned by Christianity, and in Levinas’s view, the 
Jew has not overcome what it means to be in this position.  Nonetheless, 
liberal humanism offers a level playing field on which Jew and Christian can 
be equal, or at least on which the Jew can feel that she is the Christian’s 
equal.  And it is for this reason, Levinas confesses, that he does “not speak 
lightheartedly of the Crises of humanism.”36  
Here we find Levinas’s central concern—this crisis is a crisis in Jewish 
education, which has lost its meaning.  On Levinas’s view, it is not that Jews 
have become detached from Judaism but rather that they have capitulated to 
Western humanism—to its ideals, hermeneutic methods, and abstract 
universalism. As a result, rabbinic exegesis, which is the hallmark of a 
Jewish reading of scriptural writings, has not simply been lost or forgotten; 
it has been rendered inappropriate.   
With the move toward liberal humanism, an idiosyncratic religion no 
longer served any purpose.  It had lost its “social effectiveness and 
intellectual meaning.”  Thus, to be “of a Mosaic confession was to be ruled 
by the uncertain, the outdated, and the subjective.”37 As Richard Kearney 
writes in the Preface to his most recent book, Anatheism, the God-question 
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keeps returning and with it a new set of criticisms as we see in the recent 
spate of attacks by public intellectuals from Christopher Hitchens to 
scientists like Richard Dawkins to comedians like Bill Maher, all of whom 
want to paint religion in its entirety with the same tarred brush.38  In the 
views of these commentators, to be a religious person necessarily renders 
one unsophisticated, unreflective, provincial—and even violent. For Levinas, 
however, it is the move away from Judaism that leads down an unreflective 
and dangerous path. Levinas describes Jewish education as having become 
mere “religious instruction in which ideas detached from the civilization 
that nurtured them, express in abstract and bloodless form, the ultimate 
difference still separating Jews from the homogeneous society into which 
they entered.”39  
Similar to concerns voiced by Rosenzweig in the earlier part of the 20th 
century, Levinas laments that Judaism has become only a “mental reserve” 
rather than a religion that would be an organic part of daily life. Religious 
instruction has become reduced to a few hours a week and to a bar or bat 
mitzvah where the student recites basic elements of reading and a few 
quickly forgotten gestures; it becomes separated from the very humanism 
that informed it in the first place.40  Because Jewish civilization is stored in 
written texts, the loss of Hebrew education within the Jewish schools means 
that this civilization remains hidden, inaccessible and forgotten.  Levinas 
tracks this loss to the Emancipation, to the principles of 1789 that gave Jews 
their citizenship even as it asked them to give up their particularity as Jews.  
It is not that Levinas wants to give up the privileges—rights—that 
accompanied this emancipation. Rather, he recognizes that insofar as 
Emancipation was grounded on a Christian structure, which the secularists 
ignored, Jews were increasingly encouraged to become more like Christians.  
In order for Jewish education to mean something other than religious 
instruction narrowly construed, Levinas claims that we needed a crisis of 
humanism such as we have seen in the inhumanities of the 20th century: 
World War I, the Russian Revolution refuting itself in Stalinism, fascism, 
Hitlerism, World War II, atomic bombings, genocide, and most certainly the 
philosophical discourse of Heidegger, which subordinates the human to the 
anonymous gains of Being.41  Thus Levinas questions not only what Western 
liberalism promised and what modern humanism delivered, he also worries 
about the recent critiques launched against them.  The fragility of Western 
liberalism was revealed by the inhumanities of its time and he pointedly 
asks whether this fragility consists in nothing other than “a basic inability to 
guarantee the privileges of humanity of which humanism had considered 
itself the repository.”42  
This crisis of humanism revealed the Jew as such.  That is, while the Jew 
had attempted to move into the background, to become like everyone else, 
to live in the universal world set out by Western humanism, these crises 
revealed to the Jew precisely the fragility of humanism—he asks, is there a 
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fragility to humanity in humanism?43 And he answers simply, “Yes.”  In the 
truest sense of the term, the Jew became a martyr and as such revealed that 
the “meaning of humanity is not exhausted by the humanists, nor immune 
to the slippage that is at first imperceptible but can ultimately prove fatal.”44 
Western humanism has failed and it fails because it simply cannot capture 
all of what makes us human and cannot protect humanity from those who 
would persecute others.  
The aftermath of World War II was not the first time that the Jews 
responded to their surrounding world with a recognition that something 
profound was missing from their lives. Levinas offers several examples of 
the ways that Jews tried to incorporate a dimension of “being Jewish” into 
their Western lives: the French Jewish Scouts movement, the Maimonides 
school, etc.  His point is not that the Jews wanted to announce themselves as 
persecuted but as a recognition that humanism did not capture or deliver all 
that was human.  These projects, Levinas surmises, were attempts by Jews 
“to keep alive the persecuted man’s human essence—that is to say, to act in 
such a way that in his rebellion or patience, he does not himself become a 
persecutor…”45 It was an attempt to move towards a doctrine that was 
better able to deliver meaning to life.   
Levinas finds himself situated between the fragility of a failed 
humanism that promotes universal values on one side and the response to 
the inhumanity of the 20th century, which he calls antihumanism, on the 
other.  Yet, he does not want his audience to misunderstand his mistrust. It 
is not a mistrust that abandons all human ideals.  Rather, he wants to put 
into doubt the humanism as has just been described.  He protests the belles-
lettres and the allegiance to them, which give the appearance of having a 
conviction of principles—his worry is that revolutionary literature becomes 
confused with the revolution itself.  It is a protest against “the decency that 
covers hypocrisy, the anti-violence that perpetuates abuse…” It is an 
antihumanism that in response to the failed Western humanism, “protests 
against all-powerful literature and finds its way even into the graffiti that 
call for such literature’s destruction. It is an antihumanism as old as the 
prophecy of Ezekiel, in which the real prophetic spirit is offered as the only 
thing capable of putting an end to such writing.”46 Yet, Levinas warns of this 
temptation also. The appeal of Ezekiel is an appeal to unhappiness and just 
as the rhetoric of the belles-lettres can confuse readers into believing that 
reading is the same thing as doing, so too Levinas worries about the 
rhetorical power “that builds its nest in pathos.” This kind of pathos easily 
leads to self-complacency, the enemy of education.  
In the penultimate section of this essay Levinas assures his readers that 
the crisis of humanism cannot be reduced to being opposed to the belles-
lettres nor does antihumanism “confine itself to this denunciation of 
literature and an eloquence that disguises misery.”47 Real intellectuals are 
able to remind us of the cracks in our civilization, not cover them over. They 
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are able to identify these shifts in meaning, especially when these shifts 
point to the potentially crumbling foundation.  But if intellectuals identify 
these shifts, our mistake lies in asking them to act as moralists and repair the 
structural defects they identify.  We can note the failure of the intellectual to 
perform such a task simply by recalling our earlier comments vis-à-vis 
Rousseau and Nietzsche.  
For Levinas, if we go beyond the Said—within which the intellectual 
communicates—we will find the responsibility for the Other, a 
commandment before it is pronounced. That is, we will find an originary 
message on which the collection of belles-lettres is formed. Thus Levinas 
questions not only what Western liberalism promised and delivered, he also 
worries about the recent critiques launched against them.  In other words, 
even thinkers like Foucault would offer a compelling critique of modern 
liberalism and reveal liberalism’s hypocrisy—this critique could also be an 
anti-humanism.  However, for Levinas, the kind of critique that someone 
like Foucault would offer would not in the end deliver the anti-humanism 
that he desires, a humanism of the other person. We see this point made 
most clearly in the penultimate section of the essay when he takes on the 
sex, drugs, and rock and roll culture of the 1960’s. It is difficult not to hear 
him sounding like an old-fashioned “fuddy duddy,” who is just not hip with 
the times.  His concern however is not per se with the behaviors that follow 
from a view of sexual liberation, but with the libertine approach to it, one 
that in the end is only about the satisfaction of one’s own sexual pleasure.  
He astutely observes that while this might be a kind of anti-humanism, that 
is, a critique of the hypocritical liberalism that prevails in the 20th century, it 
is not the anti-humanism that he seeks.  
He finds himself, then, positioned between two poles—the fragility of a 
failed humanism on one side and the anti-humanism that responded to it on 
the other.  He is not unaware that by situating himself in this position, he 
locates himself at the more conservative end of a political spectrum in the 
battleground of the culture wars. He recognizes that the young people in the 
Jewish community are more inclined to choose or desire, like their non-
Jewish peers, a life of “if it feels good do it” and “it’s all about me” than to 
choose a life that is “for the other person.”  In spite of what appears to him 
an impossible dream, Levinas turns to Jewish education.  He upholds 
Judaism’s view that “children who must become adults open to the 
misfortunes of others should [not] be educated in moral confusion, with no 
distinction being made between good and evil—by which I mean without 
their knowing how to recognize the misery lurking within the illusions of 
happiness, and the contentment and satisfaction to be had from mere 
happiness.”48  
The most significant point in this essay is his belief that through Jewish 
education, the young people of his day would be more able to swim against 
a current that might otherwise simply carry them along.  For Levinas, Jewish 
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education fundamentally teaches that justice is the response to the other 
person and that an education based on the Talmud would not ignore the 
sexual dimension of our lives but would help portray it in all its complexity, 
ambiguity, and indeed occasionally its tragedy.  And here Levinas makes his 
final dig at the belles-lettres for the simple and sentimental manner in which 
love and sex are often described.  But his point here is that while he wishes 
to situate himself in contrast to the libertine approach to life, he also wants 
to distance himself from the brutality of a totalitarian state that would also 
impose constraints on our personal behavior. His goal is not to control 
sexual behavior—that misses the point.  For Levinas, Judaism at its core 
focuses our actions on justice towards the other.  To live one’s life in this 
humanistic way will necessarily lead to a change in other behaviors.  
 This crisis revealed the loss incurred by Jews as they embraced a so-
called secular life and adopted the modern liberal tradition of France. 
Instead of being the echo of the surrounding civilization, Levinas implores 
French Jews to take the lead. 49 His mistrust of the surrounding humanism is 
a protest against “the declamation that takes the place of necessary activities, 
against the human decency that covers hypocrisy, the anti-violence that 
perpetuates abuse; but equally against the violence of the verbal indignation 
of revolutionaries themselves who immediately become inverted into a 
cultural pastime as they turn themselves into revolutionary literature.”50  He 
expresses a similar point in “The Transcendence of Words,” where he writes, 
“The presence of the Other is a presence that teaches; that is why the word 
as teaching is more than the experience of the real, and the Master more than 
a midwife of minds” a clear reference to Socrates.51  At the end of this essay, 
Levinas states simply that Jewish education is:  
the conviction that a limit must be imposed on the 
interiorization of principles of conduct, that certain 
inspirations must become gestures and rituals… Jewish 
education does not rely on the ineffective brutality of 
constraints imposed by the totalitarian State in order to 
maintain a law within freedom and guarantee freedom 
through law… These are practices carried out to please 
God only to the extent that they allow one to safeguard 
the human in man.  Is this a particularism? Of course. But 
it is not some limitation or other that is brought to bear on 
national allegiances, civic duty and fraternity. It is a 
particularism with regard to doctrines, anthropologies, 
axiologies and theologies.  It involves no separation from 
men.52  
What distinguishes Jewish education from other forms of education, for 
example, les belles-lettres, is that it contains within it, not simply a few 
geniuses whose work we try to repeat, but also the breadth of experience 
amassed over thousands of years; it calls us to return to its wisdom—the 
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Word, when elevated, is the Word of God.53  It calls for a new (or old) 
relationship to the law and moral obligation.  Hence, by tracing the roots of 
the problem back to 1789, Levinas links the problems of Jewish assimilation, 
Jewish humanism, and Jewish education to the development of the French 
republic and the consequences of the liberalism that it produced.54  
Although he recognizes the tremendous benefits of the French Republic to 
the Jews, he also recognizes the dangers.  It is in this ambivalence that 
Levinas locates the difficult freedom of being Jewish—the temptation of the 
secular world in which the Jew lives, the temptation to forego what seems 
old and obsolete only to adhere to these same values in a flashier package, 
the tension created by living a particular life within a public space that 
demands homogeneity.   It is in these essays on Jewish education that we 
find Levinas struggling with all of these themes and trying to reach an 
audience who is also struggling.  These essays both identify the problem and 
the solution—the Jews have lost their way, they have become too Western, 
and by that he means they no longer put the other before themselves and 
thus they no longer fail to serve as the light unto the nations, to become a 
model for others to do the same.  
If Catherine Chalier’s observation that “[t]he exigency of study is not 
sufficient in a world scarred by suffering, personal or collective” is correct, 
then she is also right to remind us that the commandment “thou shalt not 
kill” is a requirement for everyone.  We must then “question ourselves…  
about everything our own being kills, through thought, through worlds, and 
through deeds, before we think about God, or, more precisely for the idea of 
Him to gain meaning within ourselves.”  And the universalism of Levinas’s 
teaching is found in Chalier’s statement, that “[herein] lies the highest 
exigency of [Levinas’s] teaching, an exigency from which no one is ever 
released, an uneasiness which lasts as long as the span of life which is 
imparted to us…”55   
Chalier further recalls that Levinas taught them on those Saturday-
morning meetings that one should not enter a house of prayer or study with 
a cold heart. Neither should one be so self-certain about one’s relationship to 
God. Although one should get back in touch with one’s inner life, this move 
entails reading the Book, and that requires “a master who guides the 
attention, who makes the letter a teaching experience.” The link, then, 
becomes clear—the highest exigency is not to kill, to question all the ways in 
which our own being kills, to get back in touch with our inner life, to return 
to the Hebraic words, such as hineni, here I am.  These words, according to 
Chalier, were brought to life by Levinas’s presence and it is “our 
responsibility to keep them alive.”56  
Levinas recasts “the humanity of man” at stake in those writings from 
the 1930’s—“Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism” and On Escape—as 
a crisis in humanism in his essays from the 1950’s.  Importantly, he couches 
this discussion within the context of Jewish education and the failure of 
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Jewish assimilation. If the problem was that the Jews had lost their way by 
giving up their ties to a robust Jewish education and the cultivation of a 
unique subjectivity this education delivers, then the solution to the problem 
must be a return to that particular approach to education, it is through this 
approach to education that the responsibility to keep alive “those words” –
the Hebraic words, such as hineni –is fulfilled. Levinas then has offered this 
return to Jewish education as a solution for the crisis of humanism facing not 
only the Jews but all of humanity. If the Jews are to return to Jewish 
education to achieve this new subjectivity, then the other side of this 
question is, “How will non-Jews accomplish this task, if they have an 
understanding of Christianity that will not let them?”  
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